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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to determine how different variables can affect a
terrorist group’s reaction to a targeted leadership strike, known as a decapitation
strike. Decapitation strikes often produce unwanted results, such as a splintering of
the terrorist group, or a failure to destroy the group. It is important that we
understand which variables can lead to a group’s destruction after a decapitation
strike, to maximize the decapitation’s effectiveness. In my research I have
determined that group size, group ideological extremism, and the role of the leader
targeted all have a substantial impact on the success of the decapitation strike.
Using these three variables, I will examine three groups which have varying size,
extremism, and leadership, and determine whether the decapitation strikes were
successful and how these variables affected the results.
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Introduction
Terrorism has been an issue that states have had to deal with for a very long time, and
different tactics have been used to combat this global threat. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram
and ISIS have killed many people and proven resilient to the range of tactics countries use
including mass arrests, military raids, and precision strikes. One of the most widely-used
strategies for dealing with terrorist groups is known as “decapitation,” and it involves the
removal of terrorist leadership via arrest or targeted killing 1. This tactic, despite its popularity,
has not always produced desirable results, often leading to terrorist groups being unaffected or
splintering into potentially more dangerous groups. This is a great concern for any nation
attempting to fight terrorism, and therefore it is important for nations to know the circumstances
in which this tactic is most effective.
In this paper I will attempt to discover the variables that lead to a terrorist group dissolving
or splintering after the killing or capture of a leader. In this paper, I propose that the variables
that will most affect how a terrorist group is affected by decapitation are: the group’s size, how
ideologically extreme the group is, and the role of the targeted leader. I will analyze several
different groups that were subjected to this tactic and identify which variables affected the
group’s reaction to a decapitation strike. My findings will show that each group’s unique
characteristics affect their reaction to decapitation strikes, and thus governments must explore
these characteristics before committing to a strategy of decapitation.

Manes, Aaron, 2008, Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Groups
Activity?, page 40.
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Decapitation research

Price (2012) argues that decapitation tactics “significantly increases the mortality rate of
terrorist groups,” 2 using the duration of the group post-decapitation as his metric of
effectiveness. He claims that terrorist group’s “unique organizational characteristics” increase
the importance of the leaders and thus creates instability inside the group when those leaders are
killed 3. Price argues that violent groups have increased group cohesion and are led by
charismatic leaders which make finding replacements harder than in non-violent groups 4. These
two factors make leadership transitions difficult.
With those parameters in mind, Price makes the argument that decapitation of terrorist
groups is effective because of their violent, clandestine, and value-based organization 5. He also
shows that the earlier a group is decapitated, the shorter the time until the group disappears.
While factual, his findings do not answer my question of whether decapitation strategies
effectively combat terrorist groups and reduce their ability to carry out strikes. While it is
apparent that groups tend to disappear after some decapitation strikes, Price deliberately doesn’t
consider if terrorist violence is reduced. This is an important factor in determining if a group
splintered, and therefore his findings are limited.

Bryan C., Price, 2012, Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism, Page 11.
Price, 2012, page 11.
4 Price, 2012, page 17.
5 Price, 2012, page 43.
2
3
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Jenna Jordan (2014) argues that some groups can continue to operate and carry out
attacks after a decapitation strike because of two variables: bureaucracy and popular support 6.
She argues that groups which are highly bureaucratized and have large popular support can
survive these attacks because the leadership is less important. Moreover, larger and older, and
thus more bureaucratized, groups, as well as religious ones, which often enjoy public support, are
the most resilient to decapitation strikes 7.
Aaron Mannes (2008) attempts to find out if “decapitation strategies have a statistically
significant effect on the targeted organization’s terrorist activity 8.” Mannes admits that 24,000
out of the 34,000 cases of terrorism in his data base are attributed to “unknown actors, which
might make it difficult to prove his theory. This was one of the main reasons why Price decided
to instead narrow his research to group longevity instead of activity. Mannes also divided the
groups into “group type,” which included nationalist/separatist, religious, communist/socialist.
Mannes found that decapitation strikes and strikes that are followed by “crackdowns” reduce the
incidents of attacks by these groups, and for smaller groups it can lead to complete destruction of
the organization 9. While Mannes’ findings shed light on whether these strategies are statistically
useful, his lack of variables aside from the type of organization fail to answer the question of
why some groups of the same “type” are affected differently by decapitation strategies.
In her other work, Jenna Jordan (2008) uses social network analysis 10 to determine the
type of structure that groups have and how this relates to the effectiveness of decapitation strikes,

Jordan, Jenna, 2014, Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes, page 11.
Jordan, 2014, page 15.
8 Manes, 2008, page 41.
9 Manes, 2008, page 43.
10Jordan, Jenna, 2009, When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation, page 728.
6
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she also attempts to find conditions that increase the likelihood a group will collapse after a
decapitation 11 and compares the lifespan of the group after the strike with other groups that have
not undergone decapitations, and whether this decapitation affected the group’s ability to attack.
She divides the groups by organization type, age, and size, and found that decapitation strikes are
not an effective means of reducing violence or destroying groups and is the least effective
against older, larger, religious, and separatist organizations. As Jordan explained in her later
work, older organizations become bureaucratized which facilitates the replacement of leadership,
especially in large organizations 12; separatist groups also arise from social movements which are
often decentralized and enjoy mass public support. Jordan’s findings are significant because she
addressed not only the lifespan of groups after, but also the effects on their ability to carry out
attacks which is an important but sometimes overlooked element.
Patrick Johnston (2012) attempts to ascertain the efficacy of decapitation strikes by
analyzing many successful and unsuccessful removals of terrorist leadership 13. Johnston only
focuses on cases where the top leadership was targeted because killings of other individuals
might lead to misleading results 14. All the strikes observed come from asymmetric conflicts, in
which terrorist groups operate in civilian population, using guerrilla tactics, and from a minimum
month-long campaign. Johnston found that “neutralizing insurgent leaders has a substantively
large and statistically significant effect on numerous metrics of counter militancy
effectiveness”, 15 moreover, the fact that Johnston compared failed and successful decapitations is
Jordan, Jenna, 2009, page 731.
Jordan, 2014, page 15.
13 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency
Campaigns, page 49.
14 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, page 54.
15 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, page 77.
11
12
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interesting because many other studies don’t distinguish between failed decapitations and nonexistent decapitations, which can lead to wrong conclusions. By only examining successful
instances of decapitation, one cannot learn about the instances in which decapitation creates
undesired effects, Overall Johnston found approximately a 25-30% increase in a government’s
likelihood to defeat a terrorist organization, which is much higher effectiveness percentage than
previous studies.
Stuart Koschade (2006) uses social network analysis to understand how terrorist cells
communicate and operate, as well as what knowledge can be gained which might help with
counter-insurgency operations 16. This framework is useful for understanding what roles
individuals play in these organizations and which members are more likely to disrupt the
operations of the organization 17. Koschade then relates this concept to how Jemmah Islamiyah
(JI) operates, particularly in the context of the 2002 Bali bombings in which the group operated
cells that coordinated the attacks independently from the organization. Koschade then creates a
graph connecting each member of the cell, with their specific function and how many other
members are connected to that one specific member 18.
He later finds that organizations must balance covertness with efficiency, the more
connected all the members, efficiency increases but covertness decreases, as communications
between members become easier to track. This means that the more covert a cell, the more
effective targeting of an important “node” is, in JI one member was the only point of contact

16 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, page 559.
17 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 560.
18 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 567.
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between the two cells, meaning targeting such a member would likely hinder their operations
greatly 19. This article helps make the decision of who is the ideal target in a decapitation
operation, as the idea of “leadership” can be hard to identify, rather by using a social network
analysis you can identify the point of contact of specific cells or organizations and target them.
However, leadership is often more complicated than who oversees coordinating actions of
multiple members, and this article only covers the tactical operations of individual cells rather
than groups. Furthermore, in only focusing on the tactical aspect of terrorist organizations, this
fails to address the ideological importance of leaders in terrorist groups. While killing a tactical
leader in a terrorist organization might lead to a decrease in the group’s ability to carry out
attacks, it most likely will not lead to the group’s dissolution.
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2008) tries to assess the structural factors that can affect a
group’s likelihood to form factions and subsequently splinter after a major event, like the death
of a leader. Mesquita finds that as economic conditions improve, groups become less able to
mobilize and recruit but more extremist, and as a group becomes more extremist, the likelihood
of a splintering decreases. However, if a splinter does occur, the splinter group will be even more
extreme than the original, which could increase the ferocity of the attacks and spoil possible
peace agreements 20.
Terrorist groups can also increase the cost of splintering, which makes a group more
extremist when a faction is fighting for control of the group, but otherwise decreases a group’s

19
20

Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 571.
de Mesquita, Ethan B, 2008, Terrorist Factions, page 408.
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extremism 21. While not really offering many concrete and applicable answers to determine when
terrorist groups will splinter, which is very important for counterinsurgency strategies, the paper
does provide some variables which are worth exploring. Firstly, the idea that factions can affect a
group’s extremism is interesting, as it might imply that more extreme groups are more vulnerable
to leadership decapitation because of the lack of factions present. Moreover, the study’s findings
that an improvement in the economic situation of the populace and a place for non-violent
grievance resolutions increases extremism means that the presence of such variables could be
useful when combined with a decapitation strike.
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki (2008) examined terrorist groups that no longer exist to try
to draw conclusions on how future groups might also end. The authors claim that most groups
end when members stop armed struggle and join the political process or when law enforcement
arrest or kill key members of the organization 22. They also use 5 variables to determine which
one is more likely to help decide the fate of a terrorist group: ideological motivation, economic
conditions, regime type, size, and goals 23.
Policing, which is the second-most-common way terrorist groups end, works by
eliminating the terrorist organization, which includes leadership and logistics through the passing
of laws and arrests of perpetrators 24. Because terrorist groups operate in the civilian population,
police have a unique ability to gather intelligence and infiltrate these groups, to arrest its

de Mesquita, Ethan B, 2008, page 409.
Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida, page 9.
23 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 15.
24 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 27.
21
22
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members. Their data also shows that the larger a group is, the less likely a group is to end by
policing or by splintering, but very likely to end because of a turn to politics 25.
Audrey Kurth Cronin (2006) uses the decline of Al Qaeda, a large and very dangerous
terrorist group, to draw conclusions on how similar groups might end in the future. She poses
that terrorist groups generally end because of: the death or capture of the leader, failure to recruit
the next generation, achieving their goals, transitioning to a political organization, lack of
popular support, repression, or transition to other types of violence 26. I will mostly focus on the
first of the scenarios that end terrorist groups, the killing or capture of their leader. She claims
the group’s structure, presence of a viable successor and the existence of a cult of personality all
affect how effective this tactic is 27.
She then applies each of the likely end-scenarios of terrorist organizations, which I again
will focus on the killing or capture of leadership of the terrorist organization. She explains that
Al-Qaeda’s fluid structure, emphasis on independent cells, and lack of cult of personality means
it can survive decapitation 28much easier than other groups. While this article has a limited
application to decapitation, and mainly focuses on many other reasons terrorist groups end, much
can still be learned, mainly that a group’s structure, the role of the leader, and the presence of a
viable successor are a good indicator of the effectiveness of decapitation. However, all the
examples provided for why decapitation is sometimes effective were of leaders who were

Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 42.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, page 17.
27 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, page 18.
28 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, page 40.
25
26
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captured and later told their followers to stop the armed insurrection, which is a variable that was
not mentioned.

9

Hypothesis

Based on the previous literature, my hypothesis suggests that the variables that are most
likely to determine a group’s future after a decapitation strike are: how extreme the group is, the
size of the group, and the role of the leader targeted. To reiterate, a decapitation is the intentional
killing or capture of high-ranking members of an organization, with the intent to disrupt or
destroy the group because of the lack of leadership. I believe with these variables that the group
which will be most likely to dissolve and not splinter after a decapitation is a small, extreme
group, in which the leader targeted serves as the ideological core of the group. Any
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategy is ultimately supposed to lead to a reduction in
violence, and other studies often consider splintering as a counterinsurgency success. In this
paper I make the clear distinction between dissolving and splintering because if a group dissolves
but its fighters carry on the struggle, that ultimately does not lead to a reduction of violence.
Small groups naturally have less members, and thus possess a reduced ability to replace
dead leadership. Leaders of small groups also have more contact with a larger percentage of the
overall members thus increasing their importance. Larger organizations also become
bureaucratized and develop standardized procedures for their leadership which reduces the
strategic impact of the loss of leadership, and the time required to acquire new leadership. While
large groups are less susceptible to dissolve after decapitation, their large numbers increase the
likelihood factions will form and the group will splinter. As any organization grows, different
members with different agendas appear, this creates different factions within the organization
10

that could take advantage of the loss of leadership to create a new, often more extreme group
after the leader dies. To reiterate, this variable will increase the likelihood of a group splintering
and reduce the likelihood of the group dissolving after suffering a decapitation.
Extreme groups have a reduced ability to recruit new members due to the difficulty for
average people to connect with the group’s message. This reduces their ability to replace
leadership and recruit new members when they are killed. The extremism of a group’s ideology
also reduces the likelihood of factions forming, this is likely because factions are often more
ideologically extreme than the group they are a part of. This reduction in factions reduces the
chance of splintering, although if the group does splinter, the new splinter group will rank higher
on the ideological extremism scale. In summary, as a group’s ideological extremism increases,
the likelihood the group will dissolve after a decapitation strike increases and the likelihood of
splinter groups forming decreases.
And lastly, as previous research shows, eliminating leaders who are responsible for
carrying out operations often has a tangible effect on reducing a group’s ability to act but often
does not result in the destruction of the group. However, targeting a leader who is responsible for
the group’s ideology, or an ideological leader, increases the likelihood of the group dissolving.
When a tactical non-ideological leader is targeted, terrorist organizations can easily find
replacements from other senior members or from the targeted leader’s subordinates. Targeting
the ideological leader of a group often results in the group disbanding if no successor is in place
due to the morale impact of losing such an important member. Due to the nature of ideological
leaders, it is also much more difficult to find replacements for these leaders that people will
11

follow with the same fervor as the previous leader. All the previously mentioned literature has
proposed that these individual variables can affect a group’s future after a decapitation, but none
of them have used all the variables I mentioned and applied them to specific groups. To reiterate,
targeting an ideological leader increases the likelihood of the group dissolving but has an unclear
effect on the likelihood of a group splintering.
In this section, I will test my hypothesis by analyzing successful and unsuccessful cases
of terrorist decapitation, across similar groups with different previously mentioned variables. I
will categorize each group according to those variables, and how I believe those variables will
affect the group´s likelihood to either: be destroyed or splinter, after a decapitation. I will be
using case studies rather than large datasets due to the problems that are inherent in any large
data set of terrorist groups, such as mis-categorization and broad categories that are unhelpful to
the question we are trying to answer. For example, large data sets often don’t describe who they
consider a “leader,” or often make no distinction between a group splintering and disappearing.
By examining each group individually, we can better understand which variables are
affecting this specific group, which will help us make predictions on how the decapitation will
affect them. The groups that I will choose will be affected differently by the previously
mentioned variables, but will all be subjected to decapitation strikes and their results will be
compared. The groups that I have chosen are: the Muslim Brotherhood, Sendero Luminoso, and
the Taliban. I chose these groups because each of them has experienced leadership decapitation
and they all fall on different ends of the spectrum in relation to size, ideological extremism, and
the role of the targeted leader.
12

Decapitations must be viewed like any other counterinsurgency tool, and only be applied
to certain groups in certain conditions. I believe decapitation strategies are used much more than
they should be because it allows governments to claim tangible progress against insurgencies is
being made. However, while decapitations may make for great publicity and help a government
show its people progress, this strategy often does not lead to a long-term reduction in violence.
For groups in which decapitations will not be effective, like a large, non-ideologically extreme
group with a non-ideological leader, other strategies like peace negotiations must be used.

13

Case Studies

The first group I have chosen is Sendero Luminoso (SL) or “the shining path.” SL is a
communist revolutionary party that has been waging a guerrilla war against the government of
Peru since the 1980s. The group started in the 1960s in the poor Peruvian state of Ayaccucho, an
isolated area of the country where the government was largely absent and communication with
the rest of the country was difficult 29. The state had one major university which became both a
recruitment center for students and attracted many politically motivated individuals, including
the group’s eventual leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso 30. It was in this university that Guzman
built the Shining path into the insurgency that would sow chaos in Peru, training teachers to
spread socialist ideas 31, and securing weapons and money to wage a socialist revolution against
the government of Peru 32.
SL was a small group originating in the isolated state of Ayacucho and totaling about
5,000 fighting members at its peak 33 with as little as 350 members remaining active to this day 34.
Being a communist revolutionary party, which calls for armed insurrection against noncommunist nations, SL ranks high on the ideological extremism spectrum. SL’s prominent
leader, Abimael Guzmán, served not only the operational leader of the group but also as the

Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, page 197.
Ibid, page 198.
31 Ibid, page 199.
32 Ibid, page 200.
33 Manwaring, Max, G, 1995, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons, page 160.
34 BBC, 2015, Peru admits Shining Path rebels have not been 'exterminated, (accessed February 25th, 2019), paragraph 2.
29
30
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ideological base and he fostered a cult of personality around him, 35 as evidenced by his presence
in the group’s propaganda posters.
Peru’s government created a specialized police unit to gather intelligence and apprehend
SL leadership, and this strategy eventually lead to the capture of many of its leaders including
the ideological leader Abimael Guzamn in 1992. Two years after the capture of Guzman, SL
ceased being a major threat to the government 36 and, while some of its members remain to this
day 37, the group is all but destroyed. Decapitation was very successful against the SL, it took
only two years for the newly-created specialized police unit to apprehend Guzman, and two
years after his arrest the group ceased to be a threat to the government of Peru 38.
The next group I will be examining is the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban formed in
the 1990s from veteran fighters who repelled the Soviets during the Soviet war in Afghanistan,
the Taliban took advantage of the power vacuum within the country and fought for control over
the nation with other groups. In 1996 the Taliban took control of the government and established
a government that reflected its interpretation of Sharia law, which included abuses against
women and non-Muslims. The Taliban was ousted from leadership by the U.S. in 2001 during
the invasion of Afghanistan and have since started an insurgency in the nation and currently
control parts of the country 39. Because of the changing nature of the Taliban, from political

Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, page 203.
Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, page 207.
37 Ibid, page 216.
38 Ibid, page 207.
39 Laub, Zachary, 2014, The Taliban in Afghanistan, page 7.
35
36
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organization to terrorist group, this paper will focus on the Taliban after their ousting by the
United States in 2001.
As of 2014, the Taliban is believed to possess around 60,000 members in Afghanistan 40,
which is a medium-to-large number of fighters, but since the Taliban has gained strength in
recent years, the number of fighters is likely much higher. Being an Islamist fundamentalist
group, the Taliban ranks high on the ideological extremism scale but not as high as other groups
operating in the area such as ISIS. The Taliban has also been subjected to many decapitations
strikes as well as arrests and killing of many of its members 41, but those strikes have been
unsuccessful in destroying the Taliban and the group has survived over a decade of U.S.
occupation. The Taliban leadership has been targeted many times, but the leaders targeted are not
high-ranking ideological leaders but rather operational commanders in charge of day-to-day
operations. While these strikes influenced the Taliban’s ability to carry out attacks, they have
been consistently able to replace their leadership and thus those strikes have not been successful
in dismantling the organization 42.
The last group I will examine is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt is an Islamist political and religious movement with ties to the larger
international Muslim Brotherhood, and at one point one of the biggest parties in Egypt. Founded
in 1928, the group quickly grew to over a million followers and 2,000 branches in Egypt alone 43,

Waldman, Matt, 2014, Strategic Empathy: The Afghanistan intervention shows why the US must empathize with its
adversaries, page 4.
41 Wilner, S. Alex, 2010, Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and
Counterinsurgency, page 308.
42 Wilner, 2010, page 316.
43 Zollner, Barbara H, E, 2009, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology, page 11.
40
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the group also operated a paramilitary force which trained volunteer in guerrilla warfare 44. The
MB has a history of both being a political party which frequently clashed with contemporary
governments and financing para-military groups, that history has not changed much with the
modern MB. The MB continued to clash with the governments of the times, but after the
overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 2011 45, the MB entered an agreement with the military
government of Egypt to co-operatively run the nation 46 after the election.
The MB then ascended to power on June 24th, 2012, under the presidency of Mohamed
Morsi 47. Morsi continued the previous administration’s repressive policies, gave government
positions to loyal MB members 48, and used MB militias to attack the growing opposition to the
Islamist government. The military eventually ousted Morsi, prompting large protests by the MB
and allied Islamist organizations, resulting in a clash against government forces that left over
1,000 people dead 49. The government subsequently arrested an estimated 42,000 supporters and
almost all the MB leadership 50, and the group was declared a terrorist organization by the
government 51. After the crackdown, a more extreme side of the MB became visible, calling for
Egyptians to “rise in revolt” and asking for jihad against the new regime and “martyrdom” 52; it is
very likely the MB splintered after the government crackdowns, as evidenced by the shift in
rhetoric.

Zollner, Barbara H, E, 2009, page 12.
Selim, M, Gamal, 2015, Egypt under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood: the triangle of counter-revolution, page 180.
46 Selim, M, Gamal, 2015, page 185.
47 Ibid, page 189.
48 Ibid, page 190.
49 Brown, J, Nathan, and Dunne, Michele, 2015, Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
page 5.
50 Ibid, page 5.
51 Ibid, page 6.
52 Ibid, page 13.
44
45
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Being one of the largest political organization in Egypt, which won an election and
briefly ruled the nation, the MB ranks high in terms of overall size and is by far the biggest group
I will be exploring in this paper. The MB, while being an Islamist group, was mainly a political
organization that advocated for representation in Egypt’s repressive system and thus ranks low
on the ideological extremism scale. MB, like most political organizations, has very charismatic
leaders, but these leaders do not serve as the ideological core of the organization. Like most
political organizations, MB can find replacements for its leadership but not without difficulty.
Lastly, MB leadership has been routinely arrested in Egypt and that has largely eradicated the
group, although this has caused splintering within the group that gave rise to more extreme
elements.
In conclusion, this paper aims to explore the different variables that affect a group’s
likelihood to dissolve or splinter after a targeted assassination or arrest of its leadership, also
known as a “decapitation.” The variables that I will be examining in this paper are: a group’s
size, their ideological extremism, and the role of the targeted leader; all these variables have a
direct effect on the group’s future post-decapitation. In this paper I will be using case studies to
test my hypothesis rather than large datasets, because case studies allow for a broader look into
the causal mechanisms that lead to each group’s fate after decapitation strategies. The three
groups that I will be studying in this paper have all been chosen because of their differences in
size, ideological extremism, and role of leadership targeted; these groups are: the Taliban,
Sendero Luminoso, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is my objective to determine how
these variables affect terrorist groups post-decapitation, so nations can make informed decision
about when to remove terrorist leadership.
18

Sendero Luminoso

The history of Sendero Luminoso, hereafter referred to as SL, begins with the creation of
the Socialist Party of Peru in 1928 53. The Socialist Party of Peru splintered into over 20 groups
following international events such as the Sino-Soviet split and Khrushchev’s denouncing of
Stalin 54. One of the biggest splits happened between the Soviet bloc, which supported peaceful
transition into Socialism, and the Maoist bloc, which supported violent uprising 55. A split within
the Maoist bloc lead to the creation of the Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining
Path of Mariategui, led by a university professor named Abimael Guzman 56.
The group first spread throughout Guzman’s university, creating student study groups to
spread their ideology within the university and the urban centers around it 57. After this, the group
began sending activists to the countryside, involving themselves in local town meetings and
becoming teachers in the local schools 58. SL also established cells in other universities, including
two important universities in Lima and absorbing more radical individuals from other leftist
organizations active in Peru 59.
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Ideological Extremism
The ideological extremism of the SL is illustrated by the fact that even in socialist circles,
this faction of Maoism was deemed too extreme for the already extreme Maoist bloc. Unlike
other leftist organizations in Peru, which were constantly creating and breaking alliances to win
general elections, SL saw violent insurrection as the only way to bring socialism to Peru 60.
Another important aspect for determining SL’s extremism are the tactics the group used to
achieve its goals. SL’s base of support came from the peasantry, and the group wanted to further
isolate the peasantry from the government, so SL would become the de facto authority in the
area 61. The rural areas in which SL focused its efforts were already largely ignored by the
government. SL’s main department, Ayacucho, saw little government presence and did not have
a paved road until late 1970s 62.
SL captured and killed cattle rustlers, cracked down on drunkenness and adultery, and
assisted with irrigation efforts in the area 63. In villages where SL could not infiltrate and involve
itself inside, the group relied on more direct tactics, like assassinating local village leaders who
opposed the group’s attempts to establish itself as de-facto rulers 64. These villages showed open
hostility towards SL and the two often clashed, leading to bloodshed and mass migration of
peasants towards the city-centers 65. It is because of all these factors that I rank SL’s ideological
extremism as very high, and the most extreme group I will be analyzing here.
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Group size
The nature of SL, being an insurgency centered around isolated rural communities, makes
it very difficult to determine the true size of the insurgency at its peak. It is estimated that at its
peak, SL was only able to field 5,000 fighters 66, and thus it is a small group and the smallest
group I examine in this paper. While SL was able to become dominant in these sparselypopulated communities, and threaten the Peruvian government, the group did not have
substantial national support 67. Therefore, I consider the SL insurgency to rank low on the size
scale, specially when compared to the other groups I will be discussing in this paper.
Role of leader
Guzman played a central role in the group not only helping its creation but cementing and
spreading the group’s ideology through his influence in UNSCH 68 and creating a strong
leadership cadre to carry out its war 69. Guzman was not only responsible for the tactical
decisions of the group, such as sending its members into rural communities to gather support for
SL 70, but he was also the ideological center of the group. Guzman’s speeches were spread
throughout SL, and their tone changed from discussing Marxist theory to a call to violent action,
with Guzman at the top 71. Guzman’s role as the ideological leader of the SL is further illustrated
in accounts of SL guerrillas yelling “long live chairman Gonzalo (Guzman) 72 during battle.
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The structure of SL is complex, with a national committee headed by Guzman and a
small number of lieutenants and then 6 regional committees which operate with a degree of
autonomy 73. While all these regional committees operate autonomously, they all followed
directives set by the national committee. These include instructions regarding group ideology,
war strategy and policy. SL’s ideology was carefully crafted by Guzman to appeal to the rural
support base that the group relied on and based its whole identity on. The ideology targeted the
grievances held by the rural population and pointed to imperialism as the enemy 74. Just as
Guzman was responsible for creating and spreading the group’s ideology, the reliance on him as
a central figure would eventually lead to the group’s downfall.
Counterinsurgency efforts
Before the Peruvian government began targeting the leadership of the SL, they resorted to
using tactics such as arresting and executing villagers suspected of being SL members 75.
Members of the Peruvian armed forces would also burn down villages and steal supplies
suspected of belonging to SL members, as well as cover up any executions the armed forces
carried out 76. The military failed to integrate with the rural population and protect them from the
SL and would often carry out retaliatory raids against the peasantry following an SL attack 77.
These tactics were not effective at dislodging the SL from these areas, and often caused the
peasants to view the armed forces and the government negatively.
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To further exacerbate matters, the government often deployed police forces that did not
speak the villager’s language and were of a different race than the majority-indigenous rural
populations. This added racial tensions to the human rights abuses perpetrated by the
government, and further drove villagers into the arms of the SL 78. Human rights violations by the
government against civilian populations often increases the popularity of terrorist groups
operating in the area. Because SL’s Maoist ideology painted its struggle as a fight between the
repressed rural population and the capitalist urban class, these abuses were even more effective
at increasing SL’s popularity by painting the group as protectors of the rural class.
Many of the villagers that supported the SL were acting out of fear for their lives, SL
extorted business owners and killed or harmed those that refused 79. The military only made
matters worse, their numerous human rights abuses not only served to further alienate the
villagers but also drive them closer to the SL. The military crackdowns in 1982 and 1983 lead to
the creation of the SL’s People’s Guerrilla Army, which SL general Huaman claims helped
“[protect] the population” 80. While knowledge of the atrocities committed by the SL were
widespread, pressure was mounting against the government to address the human rights abuses
committed by the military. In 1985, President Garcia fired three generals as a response to human
rights violations 81, violence escalated as the SL saw this as a sign of weakness and struck Lima,
attacking restaurants and resulting in 18 months of state of emergency 82.
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Targeted Decapitations
Between 1988 and 1989, the Peruvian government changed its strategy for defeating the
SL, adopting a variety of political, social, and psychosocial as well as military strategies 83. In
1990, the government began to focus on wining the support of the local populations by providing
services, thus painting the military as protectors of the people rather than antagonists 84. To solve
the underlying racial problems, the government stationed soldiers which spoke the villager’s
language inside the villages themselves to improve cooperation between military and rural
populations. The government also began to crackdown on abuses and create militias inside the
villages which could fight SL long enough for the government forces to arrive 85. This change in
government policy was definitely a correct choice and likely had an effect in the group’s
eventual dissolving.
After 1992, the Peruvian government adopted a different counterinsurgency, moving
away from large-scale crackdowns of the civilian population and more towards operations
targeting the SL leadership 86. In May 1992, the government passed the “repentance law” which
granted amnesty or reduced the sentences of captured SL fighters 87, to encourage guerrilla
fighters to dessert. The army had previously been able to capture some of SL’s top Central
Committee members, such as Osman Morote in 1988 and Sybila Arrendodo in 1990, 88 but the
capture of these members did not have a significant effect on the insurgency. This may because
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these lieutenants did not represent the ideological center of the group but were only in charge of
the operational side of the insurgency.
This new change of strategy also led to the capture of the groups’ ideological leader
Abimael Guzman in 1992 89, dealing the biggest blow to the group. Guzman was not only the
group’s founder and leader, but a personality cult was created around him to promote group
cohesion, morale and fighting spirit 90. After Guzman’s capture, many fighters voluntarily gave
up and took advantage of the amnesty law, while others began cooperating with the intelligence
services to further speed up the end of the group 91. While some of the provincial committees
managed to survive the period after the capture of Guzman, they lacked the ability to recruit new
members outside of their small area and became easy targets for the government to eventually
eliminate 92.
Sendero Luminoso is often viewed as one of the biggest successes regarding targeted
removals of terrorist leadership, or decapitation, and with good reason. Scholars consider the
capture of Guzman to be the pivotal moment in the fight against SL 93. By the end of 1994, SL no
longer posed a serious threat to the government or the people of Peru 94. Up to that point, the
Peruvian government was fighting a losing battle against the SL, their tactics often leading to
villagers resenting the government and the army. The army eventually moved away from mass
retaliations against the civilian population and into operations targeted at removing the
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leadership of the SL. The tide turned against the group when their ideological leader, who was
responsible for crafting the ideology of the group and spreading it to recruit new fighters, was
captured in 1992. The importance of Guzman’s captured is illustrated by the many fighters that
either abandoned the conflict and returned to society or began cooperating with local authorities’
shortly after his capture 95.
It is important to note that SL largely did not splinter after the capture of Guzman, while
small remnants of SL continued to operate 96, these still followed the ideology and objectives of
Guzman. Splintering, when factions inside terrorist groups break off from the main group, is one
of the possible outcomes that can occur after a decapitation strike, but this did not happen after
the death of Guzman. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2008) finds
that as a group’s ideological extremism increases, the likelihood that a splinter faction will arise
after a decapitation strike decrease 97. I propose that this is the reason that a splinter faction of SL
did not arise after Guzman’s capture, as I previously demonstrated the group’s ideological
extremism was quite high.
Sendero Luminoso was a small group, only able to establish itself in rural communities
and lacking strong national support for their cause. The group was also ideologically extreme,
demonstrated not only due to their use of terror against civilian populations that refused to
support them, but also by the fact that even other Marxists and Maoist organizations considered
them too extreme. The group’s downfall also began after their ideological leader was captured in
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1992, something that did not happen when other members of the national committee were
captured. SL is the perfect group to illustrate my hypothesis that small, extreme groups in which
the targeted leader serves an ideological role are the best targets for decapitation operations.
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The Taliban

The Taliban is an insurgent group currently waging an insurgency in Afghanistan, and
with a large presence in nearby Pakistan 98. The Taliban’s origins date back to the 1980s during
the anti-Soviet Jihad when Mullah Omar, a Pashtun tribesman from Ghilzai, first mobilized his
followers in response to the kidnapping and rape of teenage girls by a local warlord 99. The
Taliban largely belong to an ethnic group known as the “Pashtun,” and derive much of their
identity and conduct from their ethnic identity 100. The Pashtuns living in Pakistan belong to the
same ethnic group as the ones living in Afghanistan, and consider all Pashtuns as one people,
separated by artificially created borders 101. The group continued to grow and eventually seized
control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan 102.
During their years as the de-facto rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban enforced their own
version of Sharia law 103 upon the civilian population of Afghanistan, which was previously
making strides toward gender equality 104. The Taliban passed laws forbidding women from
working, limited a woman’s movement unless accompanied by a male close relative, demanded
that women wear Burqas in public, and forbid the use of high heels 105. Women were also not
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allowed to use the same medical facilities as men, ride bicycles, or appear on television; the
Taliban created religious police that would publicly punish people who broke religious law. The
Taliban also sought to restrict women’s education, forbidding women above the age of 8 from
attending schools, killing teachers and attacking students on their way to school 106.
After the September 11th attacks, the United States declared war against the Taliban
government which was harboring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda training camps. By December
of 2001, the Taliban government was defeated, removing its presence from the area almost
entirely and eradicating its political influence 107. After the fall of the Taliban, most fighters hid
their weapons and returned to their homes, with a lot of commanders fleeing to Pakistan. Local
warlords aligned with the new U.S.-backed government replaced the Taliban as governors, and
these groups returned to exploiting the local populace 108. Because the new government was
backed by the U.S., this painted the abuses committed by the warlords as an extension of U.S.
policy. This abuse of power by forces aligned with the new government and, by extension the
U.S., increased tensions with the villagers and facilitated the return of the Taliban 109.
Counterinsurgency efforts
The Taliban in Afghanistan had now evolved into an insurgency, small groups from
Pakistan infiltrated the country and prepared for an invasion into Afghanistan 110. Between 2004
and 2006, the Taliban tried to stir up local support in the villages it occupied, they first captured
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villages before moving on to provincial capitals 111. The International Security Assistance Forces,
created and lead by NATO, responded to the Taliban insurgency with indiscriminate use of force
which led many civilians to flee into the arms of the Taliban 112. A popular revolt in Nad-e Ali
was started by the ISAF forces destroying poppy fields, and the Afghan government stealing
what little compensation the British offered the farmers 113.
The period between 2005 and 2006 saw an increase by over 400% in the number of
suicide attacks, a doubling of IED attacks, and a tripling of armed attacks, violence rose an
additional 27% in 2007 114. Taliban forces began deploying in larger numbers as the insurgency
grew, from company sized units of up to 100 fighters in 2005 to battalion-sized units in 2008,
showing the group’s growth and ability to move undisturbed 115. The Taliban did not focus on
population centers, but rather occupied villages and recruited supporters from rural areas,
utilizing ambush and hit-and-run tactics against the Afghan and U.S. security forces 116. The
Taliban also began reducing its numbers of foreign fighters, relying more on local tribespeople
for its main force, and keeping foreign fighters as IED manufacturers and trainers 117.
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan at first glance looked like a major victory. In less than
two months, the Coalition forces were able to topple the Taliban administration and institute an
interim government. However, as the years went by, the Taliban increased their presence in the
area and eventually they were able to pose a significant threat to the U.S.-backed regime. The
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Taliban continues to exist as an insurgency resisting the current Afghani government 118 which
the West continues to support militarily and economically. The Taliban currently contest 66% of
Afghanistan while fulling controlling 4%, and regularly carries out attacks against the war-weary
Afghanistan government 119.
Targeted Decapitations
In 2009, the U.S. strategy against the rapidly growing Taliban insurgency changed, away
from simple counterinsurgency operations and towards a strategy of targeted killing against
insurgent leadership 120. Eliminating all the Taliban became a very difficult task, so the U.S.
decided to instead eliminate the Taliban leadership to demoralize the fighters and force them to
abandon the insurgency 121. Because of this clear shift in policy, the period after 2008-2009 will
be used to analyze the effectiveness of these strikes on the Taliban.
In 2008, the U.S. killed Mullah Mahmoud, an important Taliban commander and several
mid-level IED makers, yet this had little effect on the Taliban’s advance 122. This is demonstrated
by their ability to attack Sarposa Prison in Kandahar City shortly after the death of the
commander, freeing 300 Taliban fighters 123. The Taliban lost many of its mid and high-level
leaders in the period between 2008 and 2009, yet this did not lead to a decrease of cohesion or
operational ability 124. The Taliban were often able to recover from the loss of leader within days
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of the attack, and the increase in instances of leadership decapitation increased the number of
attacks carried out by the Taliban 125.
Moreover, these night raids the U.S. used to eliminate Taliban leadership increased local
support for the Taliban, according to General McChrystal. These killings, rather than incentivize
the less-motivated fighters to throw down their weapons, might encourage them to adopt more
violent means 126. Insurgent leaders are usually not afraid of death, because they see the struggle
as being bigger than themselves, and state violence only serves to reinforce this mentality 127.
External pressures, such as leadership decapitations, are also useful in unifying a movement or a
group, as was the case in 2007 when 13 factions of fighters formed a coalition which became the
Pakistani Taliban 128.
Local warlords and tribes also used the United States as a mechanism to elevate their own
status, and to settle old disputes. In 2004, locals accused a tribal leader of working with the
Taliban, to benefit economically from the tribal leader’s absence 129. This led to the United States
bombing the tribal leader’s house and the leader joining the Taliban, the area which was once
friendly to the U.S. became a hot zone of insurgent activity 130. This situation highlights another
issue with the U.S. strategy of decapitation, and that is reliance on intelligence which may be
incorrect, and can lead to increases of violence, rather than a reduction.
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The U.S. expanded its decapitation efforts between 2010 and 2013, often carrying out 5
raids a night by July of 2010 131. From roughly August 11th to November 11th, Special Operations
forces averaged 17 missions per night, capturing 368 Taliban leaders and leading to the arrest of
Mullah Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban, in Pakistan 132. The Taliban experienced no loss of
cohesion due to these attacks, and their ability to carry out their own strikes did not seem to
diminish, evidenced by the assassination of Kandahar’s provincial police chief in April 2011 133.
The U.S. strategy of leadership decapitation did not lead to either a short-term reduction in
operational capability or a mass exodus of less fanatical fights and a destruction of the Taliban.
Another counter-productive by-product of the strategy of decapitations is the creation of a
younger and more ideologically extreme Taliban insurgency. The night raids in 2010 and 2010
reduced the age of the average Taliban leader by 10 years. Whereas before the extremist youth
represented a minority in the Taliban leadership, which prior to 2011 were balanced by the older
leaders, these younger members now became the loudest voice in the group. This may explain
why violence escalated after the removal of leadership, as previously discussed 134. Now that I
have demonstrated how the U.S. strategy of leadership decapitation was not effective, I will
explore the variables which I believe were most responsible for this failure.
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Size
The Taliban insurgency was estimated to have as many as 40,000 core fighters in 2012 135
and 60,000 in 2014, a sharp increase from the 10,000-20,000 fighters it was estimated to have in
the mid-2000s 136. This makes the Taliban a large insurgency, although not the largest one I will
be examining in this paper, and this is an important variable that will affect the group’s reaction
to decapitation strikes. According to Jenna Jordan, large groups are less susceptible to
decapitation strikes due to the redundant positions in the leadership, which spreads command
across several individuals and allows for those positions to be filled. Her research also shows that
larger organizations are more likely to rely on local networks for their operation 137, which is the
case with the Taliban 138, and these local networks are more resistant to decapitation strikes. I
believe the Taliban’s large size is one of the reasons that the group was not defeated through
decapitation strikes.
Role of leader targeted
The Taliban’s top leadership structure includes essential military and political guerrillas
and commanders, and these were the target of the new U.S. strategy of leadership
decapitation 139. These leaders saw the fight in Afghanistan through a lens of radical Islam,
painting the conflict as a fight between Islam and the infidel West, which now included the
government in Kabul 140. Pashtun leadership is characterized by its dynamic and headless nature,
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leaders are chosen for their personal charisma and their ability to prove themselves daily 141. The
group’s leader Mullah Omar, while highly charismatic and influential in the group, stopped
playing a meaningful part in the Taliban since 2006 142, possibly due to poor health.
The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, was not responsible for the group’s ideology and
behavior like Guzman was for the SL. This is illustrated in his opposition to the use of suicide
bombing, which was expanded against his orders. Omar’s influence was not enough to stop the
increasingly-common usage of suicide bombings against civilian populations, even as he
publicly denounced the practice 143. If the Taliban had an ideological leader, and Omar is the
closest to one the Taliban had, this practice would not have continued.
This lack of an ideological leader, who dictates the behavior and dogma of the group,
might be one of the reasons the U.S.’s multiple decapitation strikes were never able to stop the
insurgency. Cronin Audrey (2006) argues that targeting leaders who have fostered a cult of
personality increases the likelihood of successful decapitation 144, and the lack of an ideological
leader in the Taliban makes this strategy ineffective. Most of the efforts focused on the “middle
management” of the Taliban, which were easily replaced and did not lead to a decrease in
violence or cohesion within the Taliban 145.The Taliban was able to replace the leadership lost
due to U.S. strikes and grow the size of the insurgency after 2009, the acceleration of the U.S.’s
policy of decapitation.
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Extremism
The Taliban are an Islamist extremist group and they rank medium-high on the
extremism scale, while they were religious extremist, they were not as extreme as other groups in
the area. The Taliban enforced their version of Sharia law when they were in power, abolishing
non-Islamic festivals, banning all music and dancing, and prohibiting the flying of kites 146. They
also rolled back gender equality efforts in Afghanistan, banning women from working and
wearing “revealing clothing,” as well as being outside without a close male relative 147.
Compared to other Islamist extremist terrorist groups, like ISIS, the Taliban does not wish to
establish a global caliphate but rather establish sharia law within Afghanistan and end the
"foreign occupation" of Afghanistan 148. It is because of these reasons that I have placed the
Taliban on the medium-to-high scale for ideological extremism, but not as high as a group like
Sendero Luminoso.
Extremism is an important variable because, as it increases, the likelihood that a splinter
faction of the group will develop decreases 149. This may explain why the Taliban did not
experience the “fissures” and “strife between competing groups” that U.S. military leaders
expected to see 150. Outside group pressures can sometimes even strengthen groups, as evidenced
by the formation of the Pakistani Taliban 151, and this goes against the objective of decapitation. I
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believe both these group’s higher levels of extremism contributed to the lack of splinter factions
forming after decapitation strikes.
There are a couple of variables which are not explored in depth in this paper but that help
explain why the Taliban insurgency was so resilient to U.S. efforts, and that is the ethnic nature
of the Taliban insurgency and the help of neighboring Pakistan. The Pakistani political party
Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam preached about the importance of Sharia and ran networks of Islamic
schools that regularly trained Taliban leadership and recruits 152. Afghan insurgents also used
Pakistan as a safe staging grounds for offensive operations, the Taliban benefitted hugely from
the ethnic ties they shared with Pakistani villagers on the border with Pakistan 153. The existence
of a haven in Pakistan reduced effectiveness of the decapitation strikes because new leaders
could be recruited and trained in Pakistan, and the fact these new leaders shared ethnic ties with
the insurgency increased the group’s cohesion.
The failure of this strategy of decapitation supports my hypothesis that the Taliban’s
qualities, their large size and lack of ideological leadership, makes the group highly resistant to
the loss of leadership. Many mid-and-high-level leaders were captured during the period I am
examining, and this did not seem to have a meaningful impact on the group. The U.S. hoped that
the death of these leaders would bring fewer extreme fighters to surrender, like we observed after
the capture of Guzman in Peru. I believe the Taliban’s resilience to decapitation strikes provides
good evince to support my hypothesis.
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The Taliban is a perfect case study of what variables decrease a group’s likelihood to be
severely affected by a decapitation strike. None of the many attempts by the United States to
destroy the group by targeting its leadership lead to a reduction in its ability to threaten the
Afghan government long-term. I believe this is due to the lack of an ideological leader in the
Taliban whose loss would demoralize the group, and the fact that the group is large enough that
finding replacements is simpler. The Taliban, while being an Islamic fundamentalist group, is
also not the most extreme insurgency operating in the area, and this has been shown to be a
factor in reducing the likelihood the group will be severely affected by a decapitation strike. All
these variables created a group that no only survived multiple decapitations but flourished in
those subsequent years and is now in control of a large part of Afghanistan.
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Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist political organization based in Egypt and
established in 1928. The group began as a mass-opposition movement and quickly amassed over
a million followers in Egypt by 1948. At first, the group was concerned with educational reform,
but later evolved into a religious and political movement that criticized Egypt’s political
system 154. While the M.B. was largely unable to obtain political power, partially due to their
belief that the government system did not follow the guidelines of Islam, the group’s influence in
society continued to grow 155. The M.B. also operated its own para-military force which was
created in 1936 to help the Palestinian uprising 156 and later used to carry out assassinations
against government officials in Egypt. In 1948, the government of Egypt designated the M.B. as
a terrorist organization and ordered the group’s dissolution 157.
In 1952, a group known as the Free Officers overthrew the government of Egypt, and the
M.B. voiced their support for the new government. At first the M.B. and the new regime
cooperated, but their relationship continued to deteriorate as the Brotherhood’s influence grew
and in 1954 the M.B. was once again targeted by the government until 1971 158. Members of the
M.B. were gradually released from prison and in 1975 a general amnesty for M.B. members was
issued, freeing the remaining members of the organization 159. The M.B. continued to operate
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with a half-legal status 160, and its legality would continue to change throughout the years and
with each change of government.
During the 1980s, the Brotherhood focused on changing Egypt through democratic
channels, and achieved electoral success by allying with the Wafd party 161, but quickly
abandoned this strategy due to lack of support. In 2005, a constitutional amendment banned nonapproved political parties, and the Brotherhood was once again made an illegal political
organization 162. In March 2006, the Egyptian government again began targeting the Brotherhood,
and the Brotherhood would retreat from the political sphere only to sporadically organize
protests 163. During this period of oppression, the Brotherhood reverted to its roots of serving the
people and senior leaders even considered turning the Brotherhood into a charitable
organization 164.
In 2011, the Egyptian revolution, which was part of the Arab Spring, toppled the
government and created hopes of a truly democratic Egypt. These hopes that quickly faded as the
new Egyptian government persecuted the revolutionaries and worked with the United States to
serve its interests in the region 165. The Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood thus
hijacked the revolution and took positions of power in the new Egyptian government 166. The new
government put Islamists and Brotherhood members in a council which introduced amendments
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to the constitution and eventually gave the new parliament the power to draft the new
constitution.
With the Brotherhood’s help, the new amendments were approved with 77% of votes,
and secured Brotherhood control of the next parliament 167. During the parliamentary elections,
the Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed Morsi secured 52% of the votes and became the
country’s president, 168 shortly after issuing a decree that expanded his powers 169. Nationwide
protests, and the Brotherhood’s use of violence, lead to many deaths and injuries 170 until July 3rd
when the Egyptian military overthrew the Morsi regime began cracking-down on the Muslim
Brotherhood 171. The Muslim Brotherhood is different from the other groups I discuss in this
paper because, while it has a history of supporting militias, it is mainly a political organization.
Decapitation strikes against political organizations may not have the same effects as they do
against insurgent groups, and may actually drive people to further violence.
Targeted decapitations
As previously mentioned, decapitations can either take the form of killings or arrests of a
group’s leadership, and the new military government carried out a policy of mass-incarcerations
against the Brotherhood. Due to the Brotherhood long history with government crackdowns, I
will focus on the period after the ousting of Morsi in 2013. In late 2014, the number of people in
jail exceeded 42,000 and included almost all the Brotherhood’s leadership, as well as thousands
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of its local supporters 172. The Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization and the
government tied the Brotherhood to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis which is currently carrying out an
insurgency against the Egyptian government 173. In June 30th, 2015, President Abdel Fattah elSisi pledged that death penalties for Brotherhood leaders would be enforced, and a few days later
nine alleged Brotherhood members were killed during a government raid 174.
While the Egyptian government utilized a strategy of decapitation against the
Brotherhood, as evidenced by the arrest of almost all the Brotherhood’s leaders, the government
also used mass-incarceration against Brotherhood supporters 175. This goes against the general
philosophy of decapitations, in which only the leaders are targeted, in the hopes the lesscommitted members will abandon the cause 176. This is an important variable when examining the
Egyptian government’s actions because they may explain the success, or lack thereof, of this
strategy. The Egyptian government’s policy of mass-incarceration may result in more people
becoming radicalized and take up arms, as I will demonstrate below.
However, this crackdown by the government did not lead to the dissolving of the Muslim
Brotherhood, as the group has a long history of being targeted. Rather, the older members who
lived in exile called for peaceful protests the Al-Sisi regime, calling for a return to the societal
outreach that made the Brotherhood strong in past decades 177. However, the younger members
blamed the older ones and called for a violent approach, creating small insurgent organizations
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such as the Molotov Movement and the Revolutionary Punishment 178. The Brotherhood held
new elections, and by 2015 90% of the new members were part of this younger generation that
called for “jihad” against the regime 179.
There are a lot of similarities between the Taliban and the Brotherhood, which instead of
disappearing after losing its leaders, they were merely replaced with younger and more extreme
leaders. Moreover, the death of the older, and less extreme leaders led to an increase in violence
and extremism and generated anger towards the government 180181. Revolutionary Punishment
was responsible for 150 attacks on Egyptian police in its first year 182, which was supported by
part of the Brotherhood’s leadership. A book distributed online by a faction of the Brotherhood
called for open and violent “popular resistance” against the Egyptian regime 183, further showing
the increasing extremism and the rise of splinter groups inside the Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of being targeted by the Egyptian
government, the group’s influence increases and decreases with each new administration. But
just like all the previous times the Brotherhood was targeted, the group was not destroyed but
rather went into hiding and changed. It is also important to note that both during the 1948
crackdown 184 and the most recent crackdown, splinter factions of the group appeared 185, which
made the group more extreme and dangerous.
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Size
Statistics on the number of Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt at the time of the
government crackdown in 2013 are hard to find, but Mohamed Morsi received 5.7 million votes
in the first round of elections 186. We cannot assume that all those voting for Morsi were
Brotherhood members, but even if only a fifth of those voting were in fact Brotherhood members
that still make the Brotherhood a very large organization. Currently, it is estimated there are
900,000 voting Brotherhood members in Egypt 187. The group’s size is an important variable on
both why the group was not destroyed during this crackdown, which is the most severe in the
group’s history 188.
Ideological extremism
The Muslim Brotherhood was careful to not offer a detailed view of their vision for an
Egypt ruled by Islamic values 189, because of this I focus on the group’s actions to determine their
ideological extremism. During its early years, the Brotherhood used the concept of Jihad to
justify its opposition to Western influence and Zionism, creating specialized paramilitary units to
fight in Palestine and assassinate political rivals 190. However, after the Brotherhood was once
again legalized, its ideological extremism had to be reduced to appeal to young voters 191. As
evidence of the Brotherhood’s adoption of more mainstream ideas, Morsi’s presidential platform
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mentioned Islam and Sharia 14 and eight times respectively while topics like the economy and
development were mentioned 158 and 178 times respectively.
Because of this, I rank the Brotherhood’s ideological extremism between the 2011
election and Morsi’s ousting in 2013 as low-to-medium, and I think this is one of the reasons
why the group experienced splintering after 2013. In Ethan de Mesquita’s (2008) paper, he
shows that as groups become more extreme, the likelihood that the group will splinter
decreases 192, this is because the more extreme a group is, the more capable it is to placate its
more extreme factions. Whereas the Brotherhood’s insistence on peaceful resistance lead to
many splinter factions becoming disillusioned with the Brotherhood and taking actions on their
own. After the government’s crackdown of the Brotherhood a lot of splinter groups formed 193
and as of 2016 two different factions inside the Brotherhood claim legitimacy 194.
Role of leadership
The Muslim Brotherhood is mainly a political organization, and the leaders of the group
must be charismatic enough to be elected into those positions. Brotherhood leaders have a
following, and many are considered the spiritual leaders of the group, like Yusuf Qaradawi who
drew a huge crowd in 2011 after returning from exile 195. Although no longer a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, his influence is nonetheless important within the group, and his extremist
views 196 appeal to the more extreme factions of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s leaders
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serve both an operational and spiritual role in the organization, and like many political groups,
serve as the face of the movement and are thus susceptible to decapitation.
However, the Brotherhood does not derive its ideology from its political leaders, but
rather from its general principles and the teaching of founding Brotherhood members, like
Hassan al-Banna 197. This is in sharp contrast to a group like SL, where the group’s ideology
stemmed from the sermons of their leader 198, and the capture of their leader signified the end of
the group’s ideology. The group’s general principles are also vague, thus allowing it to derive its
ideology from multiple sources and individuals, ensuring no single member is the ideological
core of the Brotherhood 199.
Just like the Taliban, there are several unexplored variables that might explain why the
Brotherhood did not dissolve, but rather splinter, after the most severe wave of repression in 50
years 200. I think one of the main reasons for the group’s survival is its immense size and
international connections, which allowed its members in exile to continue. A Brotherhood branch
was open in Istanbul after the latest crackdowns, and this group is headed by Brotherhood
leadership that managed to escape before arrest 201. The Brotherhood also underwent an
ideological evolution after the government crackdowns, away from a policy of non-violence and
espousing open violence against the Egyptian regime 202. This was done because of the presence
of radical Islamist terrorist organizations in Egypt which seek to recruit disillusioned
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Brotherhood members 203. Had the Brotherhood not evolved in this way, it might have lost its
young members and been dissolved in Egypt.
Another important variable is the fact that the Brotherhood is not an insurgent group like
the last two groups I examined. The Brotherhood used paramilitary groups to both accomplish
overseas goals, like helping the Palestinian uprising 204, and to stop opposition demonstrations,
but at their core they are still a political organization. People join insurgencies because the
political avenues that are used to resolve grievances are ineffective or inaccessible 205, and
targeting a political organization may very well drive people to insurgency. Decapitation
strategies are meant to be used against insurgent groups, not political organizations, and this may
explain why this strategy did not lead to a reduction of violence or an end to the Brotherhood.
Decapitation against the Brotherhood has led to mixed results, the group went from being
one of Egypt’s largest political organization and controlling the government to now being
reduced to small remnants and splinter groups 206. However, the emergence of splinter groups and
the increasing extremism of the remnants of the Brotherhood have led to increased levels of
violence and instability in Egypt 207. However, the group’s massive size and medium extremism
have allowed it to survive so far, although many splinter factions of the group have arisen
because of the government’s crackdown. As the government extends their decapitation efforts,

Brown, J, Nathan, and Dunne, Michele, 2015, Page 10.
Zollner, Barbara H, E, 2009, Page 12
205 Dear, K. Patrick, 2013, page 305.
206 Trager, Eric, 2016, page 231.
207 Awad, Mokhtar, 2017, paragraph 15
203
204

47

and targets the younger and more extreme leaders, it is likely the group will cease to exist,
although its international reach will make that very difficult.
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Conclusions

These three cases confirm my hypothesis that: group size, ideological extremism, and the
role of the targeted leader all majorly contribute to the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. I
chose all these cases due to their different characteristics and contexts and examined why
leadership decapitation did not have the same effect on all these groups. The biggest difference
in these groups has been the effectiveness of leadership decapitation, ranging from total
eradication of the group like in SL to no decrease in cohesion or capability like in the Taliban.
Because leadership decapitation is a very important tool in the fight against insurgent groups, it
is important to examine when this tool is most effective.
While all these variables play an important role in the effectiveness of leadership
decapitations, the most significant variable appears to be the role of the leader targeted. Groups
that derive their ideology from the leader, such as SL, are especially susceptible to leadership
decapitation. This may be because the capture or killing of their leader signifies the defeat of
their ideology, or because without the leader’s guidance the remaining members do not know
how to continue the struggle. In the case of SL, Guzman created the group’s ideology through his
speeches, and it was the leader’s interpretation of Maoist ideology that formed the core of the
movement, and once Guzman was gone the group’s ideological core ceased to exist.
It is precisely this reason why I believe the Taliban was able to survive the repeated
decapitations by the U.S. in the period after 2008. The Taliban did not derive its ideology from
Mohammed Omar, but rather from the group’s interpretation of the Quran and their Pashtun
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codes. Omar’s repeated attempts to stop the younger and more extreme Taliban leaders from
engaging in suicide bombings demonstrates that he did not have the same role as Guzman, whose
commandments would never be ignored in SL. The Taliban was able to replace its dead
leadership without much effort, unlike SL which was unable to survive without its ideological
leader and its ideological core.
Ideological extremism plays an important role in the group’s likelihood to splinter after a
decapitation, splinter groups are often more dangerous and extreme than the group they
splintered from. This is quite evident in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which after
repeated arrests of its leaders and members, the group splintered into many more extreme
factions which carry out violent attacks in Egypt. The Taliban, on the other hand, was able to
remain cohesive after repeated decapitations, and avoid the splintering that the Brotherhood
underwent. This is because the Brotherhood was not an ideologically extreme group in 2011 and
was not able to cater to its more extreme members who became disillusioned by the Brotherhood
after repeated decapitations and mass-incarcerations.
Lastly, groups size is a very important variable, because it allows groups to very quickly
replace lost leaders and members. The Brotherhood, the largest group I examined, still had
900,000 members after all the repeated attempts to eradicate the group. The Brotherhood’s size
also meant they had an international presence which would further complicate the eradication of
the group. The Taliban was also a large insurgency, and it was also able to replace its lost
members and leaders very quickly and escalate its attacks after decapitations.
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Recommendations

Now that I have shown why these variables are important when carrying out decapitation
strikes, it is important to make policy recommendations to avoid unintended consequences of
decapitation strikes. As clearly demonstrated, decapitation strikes can have wildly different
effects on groups depending on how they are affected by the variables. Before carrying out a
policy of decapitation, nations need to utilize their intelligence apparatus to attempt to
understand the groups they wish to decapitate. This process will take time, but it will avoid
counterproductive results, like escalations of violence, which may result from targeting the
wrong groups.
Decapitations are one tool of many in the arsenal of counterinsurgency, and like any
tools, it must only be used in specific circumstances. Gathering this information may take time,
but the results from targeting a group that is not susceptible to decapitation strikes will likely
make the situation worse. It is also important not to target just any leader, like the U.S. did in
Afghanistan, but make sure the leaders that are targeted will cause the downfall of the group. If
the recommendations laid out in this paper are followed, I believe this will lead to much more
successful decapitation strikes.
If decapitations are not useful in those scenarios, the question remains on how to deal
with large, non-ideologically extreme groups that do not have ideological leaders. Luckily, those
groups are the easiest to deal with politically. If a group has large public support, as reflected by
its large size, it is very likely they have a valid political criticism and addressing that criticism
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might lead to a reduction in violence. Political solutions to insurgencies are often not very
popular, since the population might feel anger towards these groups, but if the ultimate goal is a
reduction of violence, these solutions should at least be considered.
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